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REPUBLICANISM AND THE LAW OF INHERITANCE
IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY ERAt
Stanley N. Katz*
Perspicuity and precision are the only things endeavoured at: the
subject is incapable of ornament.
William Blackstone, A Treatise on
the Law of Descents in Fee-Simple

(Oxford, 1759)
However great may be the advantage of enjoying a rich patrimony, handed down to us from father to son, in general, industry
and knowing how to get on in the world are worth more to young
men than inherited property.
Moral, Puss in Boots

This Article deals with the history of the law of inheritance during
the era of the American Revolution, but its focus is actually more
general, for it ultimately seeks to determine what sort of revolution
we experienced. For the historian the problem is quite familiar, but
a few observations seem pertinent. It is at least possible to argue
that our colonial forefathers were not waging a revolution at all.
Rather, one might say they were fighting what we should now call
a colonial war of independence in which the overriding issue was
"home rule." On this hypothesis, the m~,in slogan of the 1760's, "No
taxation without representation," captures the basic issue, and the
Battle of Yorktown (and the Treaty of Paris) define an end point
for "the Rebellion." To most historians this seems an excessively
narrow interpretation, but it ill-behooves those who have witnessed
the violent progress of recent history to minimize the desire for
national self-definition and self-government.

t This Article is based on the author's Thomas M. Cooley Lecture at The University of Michigan Law School, delivered on November 3, 1975.
I am grateful to Dean St. Antoine and his colleagues at The University of Michigan Law School for the opportunity to deliver one of the Thomas M. Cooley Lectures
for 1975. In preparing and revising the lecture, I have been .aided by my former
research assistants, Professor Martha Fineman of the University of Wisconsin Law
School and Professor Paul Finkelman of Washington University, St. Louis. I also
wish to express gratitude to Gerhard Casper, Whitmore Gray, Thomas Green, and
John Langbein for their helpful comments. For this Article, as for my other work,
I am indebted to the critical colleagueship of Morton Horwitz and William Nelson.
* Professor of Legal History and Associate Dean, The University of Chicago
Law School. A.B. 1955, M.A. 1959, Ph.D. 1961, Harvard University.-Ed.
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It is possible, however, to construct a far more complex version
of the "war for independence" theory, arguing that the need for independence grew not so much out of reaction to imperial distance
and governmental excess as out of a radical transformation in
America of ideas about politics. This view has the advantage of distinguishing our rebellion from those of the contemporary Third
World, a distinction made necessary by the contrasting origins of the
American colonists and the peoples of India, the Belgian Congo, or
Algeria. Unlike these subjugated indigenous peoples, the Americans were natives to the culture of their imperial rulers, and the appeal of self-determination is probably too simplistic to explain why
such people opted for the trauma of war and the uncertainties of
independence.
There is a third hypothesis, suggested to historians by the Progressive politics of the early twentieth century, which posits that the
struggle for home rule was accompanied by a contest over who should
rule at home. It maintains that the internal revolution of American
vefi!US American caused the external revolution of Americans versus
British. The theory has taken a good many different forms, but in
general it insists that the Revolution represents the overturning of
the quasi-aristocratic social and political order the imperial system
had created and supported in America. The Revolution is thus seen
~ the product of an alliance consisting of the newly emergent mer-.
chant class, the mass of petty agrarians, and the urban workers, all
of whom had been systematically excluded from access to power in
colonial society. The corollary to this theory is that once the alliance
produced a democratic revolution (expressed in the rhetoric of the
Declaration), the monied classes staged a successful counterrevolution against their former allies in the late 1780's, resulting in the Constitution of 1787-1788.1
This is not the place to attempt an evaluation of these confli9ting interpretations of the Revolution, but I trust they suggest both the
wide range of possible views and, more important, the contemporary
significance of which view we take. In rethinking the character of
the Revolution, one of the most promising strategies involves an in1. See B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1967); M. JENSEN, THE FOUNDING OF A NATION (1968); G. WOOD, THE CREATION
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBUC 1776-1787 (1969); THE REINTERPRETATION OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1763-1789 (J. Greene ed. 1968), especially Greene's intro•
ductory essay, The Reappraisal of the American Revolution in Recent Historical
Literature, in id. at 2.
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quiry into the manner by which the institution of law affec_ted the
progress of the Revolution and was affected by it. The concept and
institution of property are central to the inquiry, for, in any hypothesis of the causes of the Revolution, the character and control of
property are central themes. Curiously, the subject of property has
seldom been singled out for study by historians of the Revolution,
although at the moment there seems to be a significant body of as
yet unpublished writing on the problem. 2 Rather than try to anticipate this important addition to the literature, this Article singles out
for inspection one small aspect of the institution-the law of testate
and intestate succession-in the hope that it will suggest the
potential rewards of the larger inquiry.
Intuitively, the question of inheritance is central to the conception of property. Moreover, the law of inheritance represents a
major intersection of public and private law. In the study of revolution, the law of inheritance may serve as a touchstone measuring the
depth of revolutionary transformation in a society. When revolutionary ideals overreach deeply embedded sentiments on matters of
importance to individuals, the ideology inevitably succumbs, as, in
one famous example, the Bolsheviks discovered in their futile effort
to abolish inheritance shortly after taking power.3
2. Among the unpublished work one must emphasize the Ph.D. dissertation of P.
Lucas, Essays in the Margin of Blackstone's Commentaries (Princeton, 1963). The
American theory of property is considered in J. Nedelsky, Property and the Framers
of the United States Constitution: A Study of the Political Thought of James Madison, Gouverneur Morris, and James Wilson (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1977).
'
Morton J. Horwitz and Harry N. Scheiber have also published essays dealing with
aspects of the problem. See Horwitz, The Transformation in the Conception of
Property in American Law, 1780-1860, 40 U. Cm. L. REV. 248 (1973); Scheiber, The
Road to Munn-Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose in the State
Courts, 5 PERSPECTIVES AM. HIST. 329 (1971). See also W. NELSON, THE AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAw (1975); F. McDonald, The Taking Issue: A Constitutional Perspective (Historical Background to 1791) (Unpublished Paper, October 1976). For the most comprehensive example of the significance of the study
of inheritance in the fields of anthropology, history, and sociology, see FAMILY AND
INHERITANCE: RURAL SocIETY IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1200-1800 (J. Goody, J. Thirsk
& E.P. Thompson eds. 11976), especially Cooper, Patterns of Inheritance and Settlement by Great Landowners from the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries, in id. at
192; Goody, Inheritance, Property and Women: Some Comparative Considerations,
in id. at 10; Kiernan, Private Property iti History, in id. at 361.
·
3. In 1918, the new Soviet government promulgated a law providing that all property would revert to the state upon the death of its owner. However, the lack of
an adequate apparatus to enforce the law and subsequent "interpretations" that significantly limited its application quickly reduced the law to a mere "declaratory statement." See 1 V. GsovsKI, SoVIET CML LAw 624-25 (1948). Later efforts to restrict the descent of wealth by imposing a maximum allowable inheritable estate and
by levying progressive estate taxes were equally ineffective. See id. at 627-28. In
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The American revolutionaries never proposed to pursue such a
radical course; nevertheless, their rhetoric often seemed to call for
thorough reform of the law of inheritance. After setting forth the
historical and theoretical framework for discussion of inheritance in
the late eighteenth century, this Article examines the course of legislative reform and the proposals advanced in America and Europe
by leading spokesmen of republican ideals, the revolutionary ideology
of the era. By comparing the ideological doctrine with the actual
results obtained, this Article hopes to contribute to 'OUr understanding
of the character of the American Revolution.
I.

THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF INHERITANCE

The context of the problem will perhaps ·be more apparent if we
first examine the intellectual justifications for the concept of inheritance and then examine the Anglo-American legal tradition.
Broadly speaking, two sorts of justification for the law of inheritance
have been advanced: one is derived from the Romano-medieval
natural rights tradition, and the other emerged out of modem-that
is, eighteenth century-conceptions of popular sovereignty and legal
positivism.
Hugo Grotius is perhaps the best known of the post-medieval
continental advocates of the natural rights position. In his great
work De jure belli ac pacis libri tres, written in 1648, Grotius argued
that the right to transmit property by will follows from the natural
order of things. "Though in fact a will," Grotius wrote, "as other
a,cts, can take a definite form in accordance with municipal law,
nevertheless in its essential character it is related to ownership, and,
if we grant that, it belongs to the law of nature." 4 In his view, the
rules of intestate succession obtain legitimacy by virtue of their correspondence with the presumed intention of decedents in a state of
nature:
Aside from all positive law, intestate succession, as it is called, after
ownership has been established, has its origin in natural inference as
to the wishes of the deceased. Since the force of ownership was such
that it could be transferred to another at the will of the owner, so
also in case of retention of ownership at the time of death . . . if
1948, Gsovski asserts, there was "no limitation on the value of an inheritance in Soviet Russia. A governmental fee is collected for the issuance of inheritance certificates. The scale is progressive and the highest rate is 10 per cent." Id. at 628-29.
For a typical American casebook account of the Soviet experiment, see J. DUKB·
MINIER, JR, & S. JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS 51-53 (1972),
4. 2 H. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES 265 (F. Kelsey trans.
1925).
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any one had given no indication of his wishes, nevertheless, since it
was not credible that his intention was to yield his property after his
death to the first who would take it over, the inference is that his
property is to belong to the person to whom it is especially probable
that the dead man had wished that it should belong. 5
But of course it was Locke who, in his First Treatise, written
in 1689, gave the classic English account of the natural rights argument. According to Locke, "[i]f anyone had began, and made himself a Property in any particular thing," here referring to his labor
theory of value, "that thing, that possession, if he dispos'd not otherwise of it by his positive Grant, descended Naturally to his Children,
and they had a right to succeed to it, and possess it." 6 Locke recognized-that the right of children to take such property was not selfevident, especially as natural resources ( "the Creatures" in Locke's
term) used by a person should return, upon his death, to the
common stock of society. He rejected the easy answer that "common consent hath disposed of it, to the Children" for although "Common Practice" does indeed so provide, nevertheless
the common consent of Mankind . . . hath never been asked, nor
actually given: and if common tacit Consent hath establish'd it, it
would make it but a positive and not a Natural Right of Children
to Inherit the Goods of their Parents: But where the Practice is Universal, tis reasonable to think the Cause is Natural. 7
Locke found the true reason in the interlocking natural principles
of self-preservation and procreation. Reproduction fulfills the
human instincts to propagate the species and to achieve an immortality. But since children are incapable of maintaining themselves, their
parents have an obligation, and an instinctual urge, to provide fdr
their sustenance and comfort. To Locke, the principle of procreation "gives Children a Title, to share in the Property of their Parents,
and a Right to Inherit their Possession." 8 Locke even went so far
as to say that children actually shared in the title to their parents'
property:
Men are not Proprietors of what they have meerly for themselves,
their Children have a Title to part of it, and have their Kind of Right
joyn'd with their Parents, in the Possession which comes to be wholly
theirs, when death having put an end to their Parents use of it, hath
taken them from their Possessions, and this we call Inheritance. 9
5. Id. at 269.
6. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES
1. Id. § 88, at 224.
8. Id. § 88, at 224-25.
9. Id. § 88, at 225.

OF GOVERNMENT §

87, at 224 (P.

Laslett ed.

1960).
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This natural rights justification for inheritance, with its deeply
ingrained respect for private property rights and the familial organization of society, has always had an intuitive appeal in AngloAmerican culture, and the theory has occasionally emerged in
modern case law. The most famous example is doubtless the 1906
statement of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Nunnemacher v.
State, 10 in which the court held an inheritance tax unconstitutional
because it abridged the natural rights tradition as expressed in the
Declaration of Independence and the Wisconsin constitution. The
court declared that "there are inherent rights existing in the people
prior to the making of any of our constitutions," that such rights are
not specifically defined "but are included under the very general
terms of 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,'" and that the
pursuit of happiness "[u]nquestionably" comprehends "the acquisition of private property." 11 By the court's definition, the right to
acquire property includes a subsidiary right ~o dispose of it at death:
"[T]here is planted in the breast of every person the desire to
possess something useful or something pleasing which will serve to
render life enjoyable, which shall be his very own, and which he may
dispose of as he chooses, or leave to his children or his dependents
at his decease." 12 Such a natural right to effect one's testamentary
desires, the Wisconsin court thought, "has been the controlling idea
of the race, the supposed goal of earthly happiness," and "the right
of the descendents, or some of them, to succeed to the ownership
has been recognized from the dawn of human history."13 The court
had a little more difficulty in demonstrating the naturalness of the
right to dispose of property by w.µl, but it asserted the right in any
case and warned that, in the absence of such a right, legislatures
could abolish the right of inheritance, thereby turning "every feesimple title into a mere estate for life, and thus, in effect, confiscate
the property of the people once every generation. "14
Nunnemacher is, however, an isolated moment in the history of
American jurisprudence, for the mainstream of our tradition is
clearly marked by the positivist spirit of Blackstone and the theorists
of legislative sovereignty. Blackstone explained the basis of inheritance in the first chapter of the second book of his Commentaries
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

129
129
129
129
129

Wis.
'Wis.
Wis.
Wis.
Wis.

190, 108 N.W. 627
at 200, 108 N.W.
at 200, 108 N.W.
at 201, 108 N.W.
at 202, 108 N.W.

(1906).
at 629.
at 629.
at 62~.
at 630.
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on the Law of England15 and flatly denied the natural rights theory:
We are apt to conceive at first view that it has nature on it's side;
yet we often mistake for nature what we find established by long and
inveterate custom. It is certainly a wise and effectual, but clearly
a political, establishment; since the permanent right of property,
vested in the ancestor himself, was no natural, but merely a civil,
right. 10
Blackstone argued that natural-law theory suggests. that "on the
death of the possessor the estate should again become common,"17
that it should revert to its natural state and thereby be available to
the first occupant and user. But any such process would, in his view,
lead to enormous discord in a perpetual rush to lay claim to the properties of the recently deceased, and it was therefore "for the sake
of civil peace" that society began to order inheritance •by legislation.
Thus
the universal law of almost every nation (which is a kind of secondary law of nature) has either given the dying person a power of continuing his property, by disposing of his possessions by will; or, in
case he neglects to dispose of it, or is not permitted to make any disposition at all, the municipal law of the country then steps in, and
declares who shall be the successor, representative or heir of the
deceased; that is, who alone shall have a right to enter upon this vacant possession, in order to avoid that confusion which it's becoming
again common would occasion.18
That the positivist tradition ran deep in America is suggested by
the manner in which James Otis, no stranger to the siren song of
natural rights, developed the positivist argument in defending primogeniture in a Massachusetts litigation of 1763. Otis asserted that
"[t]he Manner of Succession, if traced to its Original, is merely arbitrary. . . . States have an undoubted Right to settle it as they
please."19 Although he expressly rejected the natural rights theory,
he maintained that once a state had settled upon a particular pattern
of descent, it should not repudiate it. 20 Judge Ellsworth of Con15. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES (3d ed. Oxford 1768) (1st ed. Oxford
1765).
16. Id. at 11.
17. Id. at 13.
18. Id. at 10-11.
19. Baker v. Mattocks (Super. Ct 1763), in REPORTS OF CASES .ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS
BAY, BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772, at 69 (J. Quincy, Jr. ed. 1865) [hereinafter cited as
MASSACHUSETTS BAY REPORTS].
20. Baker v. Mattocks (Super. Ct. 1763), in id. ·at 69. See also J. ScURLOCK,
RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION .AFFECTING !NTERBsrs IN LAND 90-'105 (1953); McMurray,
Liberty of Testation and Some Modern Limitations Thereon, 14 ILL. L. REV. 96
(1919) (an excellent but much neglected essay).
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necticut expressed a similar view in another early case. After pointing out that property originally flowed from possession, Judge
Ellsworth observed that in the state of. nature the property of a decedent belongs to whomever first establishes possession. This system obviously promotes disorder:
To prevent disputes, the laws of society point out a successor, and
sometimes, from principles of policy still more refined, permit the last
occupant to do it himself. The right to direct the succession of estates by will, is not a natural, but municipal right-a mere creature
of law; as is holden by all modern civilians, and is well illustrated
by Dr. Blackstone. 21
American state and federal courts since the foundation of the new
nation have been equally committed to the positivist argument. The
United States Supreme Court's flat statement in United States v.
Perkins22 stands for the prevailing doctrine: the right to dispose of
property at death "has always been considered purely a creature of
statute and within legislative control."23
Despite this judicial endorsement of the positivist theory and
Bernard Bailyn's brilliant argument24 that Revolutionary American
political thought emerged out of the radical Whig tradition in AngloAm<?rica, we still must acknowledge that the natural rights tradition
formed an exceedingly important part of the intellectual ferment of
the American Revolution. After all, the Declaration of Independence justified colonial separation from Great Britain on the basis of
"the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God," and, in a Lockeian vein,
went on to hold that "all men . . . are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness."25 Such natural rights thinking might
have led in either of two directions with regard to the law of inheritance. On the one hand, it could simply have reinforced the right
of inheritance and stood as an ultimate, constitutional guarantee
against the legislative abolition of that right, in which case, as
Nunnemacher suggests, it might also have provided an even greater
freedom of testation than Americans currently enjoy. On the other,
21. Judge Ellsworth's notes to Adams v. Kellog, KIRBY'S CONNECTICUT SUPERIOR
COURT REPORTS (1785-1789) 438 (1789). St. George Tucker, in his edition of
Blackstone, was similarly emphatic that "all laws relative to property are juris positivi." 2 w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 113 n.10 (S. Tucker ed. 1803).
22. 163 U.S. 625 (1895).
23. 163 U.S. at 627. For the most recent survey of the subject, see Chester, Inheritance and Wealth Taxation in a Just Society, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 62 (1976).
24. B. BAILYN, supra note 1.
25. 1 T. JEFFERSON, THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 429 (J. Boyd ed. 1950).
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the natural rights philosophy of the Declaration might have stimulated a radical egalitarianism ("all men are created equal") condemning the traditional law of inheritance as paternalistic and nonegalitarian. Thus the natural rights icomponent of the Revolution
provided relevant but ambiguous guidelines for the study of inheritance. I hope to show that in the end it w~ the theory of the positivist Blackstone that was used to support the conclusions of Grotius
and Locke, while the more radical egalitarian potential was only
fleetingly articulated and never realized.

II.

THE LAW OF INHERITANCE IN COLONIAL AMERICA

Before examining the idea of inheritance in Revolutionary
America, I must sketch the general outlines of the legal institution
as it existed in England and colonial America. The English law of
inheritance as it came down to Blackstone in the middle of the eighteenth century was still largely a feudal product, and, as Maitland
wrote, one of the most complicated and least satisfactory branches
of English law:
It is in the province of inheritance that our medieval law made its
worst mistakes. They were natural mistakes. There was much to
be said for the simple plan of giving all the land to the eldest son.
There was much to be said for allowing the courts of the church to
assume a jurisdiction, even an exclusive jurisdiction, in testamentary
causes. We can hardly blame our ancestors for their dread of intestacy without attacking their religious beliefs. But the consequences
have been evil. We rue them at the present day, and shall rue them
so long as there is talk of real and personal property. 26
Reduced to essentials, the law of inheritance in eighteenthcentury England is described as follows. Upon an individual's
death, the law provided for transmission of his property either to
those he designated in his will (testamentary disposition) or, in the
absence of a valid will, to his heirs according to a statutory scheme
of distribution (intestate succession). Englishmen long enjoyed the
power to devise personal property by will, but they did not obtain
a similar power to dispose of real property until passage of the Statute of Wills in 1540. This Henrician legislation established supstanfoil liberty of testation in England (and, significantly, also established
substantial freedom for alienation of property before death), al26. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HisroRY OF ENGLISH LAw 363 (2d ed.
S. Milsom 1968). This passage touches upon several of the principal complexities
and inequities of the English law: the distinction between real and personal property,
the overlapping jurisdiction of common law and ecclesiastical courts over probate
matters, and the doctrine of primogeniture.
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though dower, curtesy, the Rule Against Perpetuities, and certain
other doctrines impinged somewhat on the free will of the testator.
As Maitland pointed out, however, carrying out the terms of a will
was complicated by the division of jurisdiction between common-law
courts, which administered the distribution of the decedent's real
property, and ecclesiastical courts, which handled his personal property. 27 One additional significant feature of the English law of inheritance was the doctrine of entail, which enabled a testator to restrict the power of the designated recipients of his real property to
alienate the property during their own lifetimes. When a decedent
died intestate, his lands descended to his eldest son · (primogeniture)
and his personal property descended in equal shares to his children,
with a portion being reserved for his surviving spouse.
In sum, a man of property in eighteenth-century England could
dispose more or less freely of his wherewithal by will, while at the
same time the provision for intestate succession operated clearly in
favor of his immediate family. The law controlling both testamentary and intestate succession was, to modern eyes, a frightfully
complicated melange of half-modernized medievalisms. The institution of inheritance was even more complex because, in addition
to the formal mechanisms of inheritance, there existed (especially
among the wealthy classes) a highly developed system of contractual
family settlements, trust creations, and similar nontestamentary arrangements. 28 The result, incidentally, was a system of inheritance
that could not operate without a large and sophisticated legal class.
The American colonists followed the general spirit of the English
law of inheritance, which was transported to America with many of
its complications and confusions, although statutory and judicial innovation occurred in every colony. 29 The absence of ecclesiastical
courts led either to the creation of secular probate courts, thereby
anticipating a later English development, or to the extension of common law or equity jurisdiction to succession of personal property,
Considerable divergence from the English rule of primogeniture occurred--especially in the New England colonies, which generally
opted for partible inheritance of intestate estates, frequently reserv27. Id. This intricacy was not transmitted to the New World, where a system
of ecclesiastical courts never took root.
28. See generally T. PLUCKNEIT, CONCISE HlsrORY OF nm COMMON LAW 71146 (5th ed. 1956).
29. See generally R. MORRIS, SruDIES IN THE HlsrORY OF AMERICAN LAW 69-125
(2d ed. 1959).
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ing a double portion for the eldest son. Entail, however, operated
in all the colonies after the English fashion.
As this pattern of restrained innovation suggests, the colonists
were not inclined to abandon the traditions to which they were accustomed. Their annoyance with the complexities of the English
law of inheritance paralleled the complaints they leveled against
property law generally. When reform occurred, the colonists did
little more than tinker with the periphery of the institution.

III.

THE LAW OF INHERITANCE IN REVOLUTIONARY
AMERICA

For the Revolutionary generation, the law of inheritance took on
a new, strategic importance, since it appeared to symbolize the aristocratic aspects of English government against which the Revolution
increasingly directed itself. The absence of dramatic change in the
law of inheritance during the colonial period should not distract attention from the disparities in the settings of inheritance in England
and America. The socioeconomic impact of inheritance, particularly as to real property, was far less in North America than in England, where land was scarce. Moreover, the social and political
structure of the American colonies was vastly less aristocratic than
that of the Mother Country, and nowhere did this fact have more
obvious and profound consequences than in the institution of inheritance, which, after all, furnished the principle that defined the succession to the Crown and the peerage, thereby determining the
membership of the governing elite. Seen in this light, the contrast
is a perfect example of Louis Hartz's thesis of the significance of
America's lack of a feudal past. 30
Theoretically, at least two courses should have been possible for
the Revolutionary lawmakers. The first was repudiation of the traditional concept of inheritance. The second was reform of the law
of inheritance by excision of what were regarded as its aristrocratic
excesses, namely primogeniture and entail. This section examines
the reformist path. The proposals of the exponents of radical
change are considered in the following section.
Reform was naturally more appealing to the English society of
America than was repudiation of traditional inheritance schemes.
The subject of this reform was discussed at one time or another in
~

30. See L. HARTZ, THE LmERAL TRADmoN IN AMERICA (1955).
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most of the Revolutionary colonies. In Massachusetts, James Otis
argued tp.at the impetus to abolish entail was long standing:
The Common Law and Policy of England have been, this 4 or 500
years, tired of these entailed estates; . . . Many have been the ill
Effects felt both by State and Individuals, in Conveyance of these
Estates; therefore so far from being favoured they have ever been
discountenanced; and surely never was such an Estate as is here contended for, favoured. 31
His argument, one might add, was as ill conceived as his defense

of primogeniture two years earlier. 82
The brightest example of the reform process is the revision of
inheritance law in Virginia, where statutory reform, largely the work
of Thomas Jefferson, was comprehensive. Throughout the seven.teenth century, Virginia had followed rather closely the traditional
English law. In 1705, however, the General Court passed an act
forbidding the docking of entails except by special acts of the legislature, thereby foreclosing resort to the traditional and relatively
painless E.nglish mode of terminating entails by fine and recovery.
Subsequent legislation restored the right of docking for small estates
and allowed the leasing of entailed land, but for the most part Virginia inheritance law prior to Jefferson's campaign to republicanize
the state's legal system largely adhered to the English system. 88
Jefferson's first success was the legislation of 14 October 1776
that abolished entails. The preamble to this act clearly stated its
purpose:
Whereas the perpetuation of property in certain families by means
of gifts made to them in fee-tail is contrary to good policy, tends to
deceive fair traders who give a credit on the visible possession of such
estates, discourages the holder thereof from taking care of and improving the same, and sometimes does injury to the morals of youth
by rendering them independent of, and disobedient to, their parents;
and whereas the former method of docking such estates tail by special act of assembly formed for every particular case employed very
much of the time of the legislature, was burthensome to the public,
and also to the individuals who made application for such acts. 84

Three years later Jefferson prepared a "Statute of Descents" to
abolish primogeniture and replace it with partible inheritance in
equal shares to the children of a decedent. He desired, he said in
31. Banister v. Henderson (1765), in MASSACHUSETIS BAY REPORTS, supra note
19, at 140.
32. See text at notes 19-20 supra.
33. This account follows Keim, Primogeniture and Entail in Colonial Virginia,
25 WM. & MARY L.Q. 545 (1968); see also 1 D. MALONE, JEFFERSON AND His TIME
251-60 (1948); 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at app. 11-51.
34. 1 T. JEFFERSON, supra note 25, at 560.
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his autobiography, "to abolish the law of primogeniture, and to make
real estate descendible in parcenary to the next of kin, as personal
property is by the statute of distribution." 35 This statute was finally
enacted in 1785, and thus, within two years after the end of the
Revolutionary War, Virginia had done away with both entail and
primogeniture. South Carolina and Delaware had abolished entail
in 177 6, and by the end of the eighteenth century virtually all of
the new American states had eliminated both devices, although the
several alternatives to primogeniture they enacted for the distribution of intestate estates varied considerably.
The state constitutions of 1776 provide additional evidence of
the effort to reform the law of inheritance. The New Jersey constitution provided that the estates of suicides should not be forfeited
"but shall descend in the same manner, as they would have done,
had such persons died in the natural way."86 The Maryland constitution forbade the devise of lands for the support of "any minister,
public teacher, or preacher of the gospel, as such, or any religious
sect, order or denomination," although bequests of less than two
acres of land for the actual construction of a house of worship were
permitted. 37 North Carolina proclaimed that "perpetuities and
monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free State, and ought not
to be allowed." 38 Pennsylvania39 and Georgia40 wrote regulation
or abolition of entail into their Revolutionary constitutions. Several
states forbade hereditary honors, 41 and New Hampshire provided
that "[n]o office or place whatsoever in government, shall be hereditary-the abilities and integrity requisite in all, not being transmissible to posterity or relations." 42
In fact, however, this legal and constitutional change was largely
formal and symbolic. Primogeniture did not exist in many of the
colonies, especially in New England, prior to the Revolution, and it
is not clear that the use of either primogeniture or entail to restrict
the distribution of property was widespread. Indeed, detailed stud35. 2 id. at 393n. Jefferson successfully opposed an attempt to include a provision for a double share to the eldest son.
36. N.J. CoNsT. of 1776, art. XVII, in 5 F. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS 2597 (1909).
37. Mo. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXIV, in 3 id. at 1690.
38. N.C. CoNsT. of 1776, art. XXIlI, in 5 id. at 2788.
39. PA. CoNsT. of 1776, art. 37, in 5 id. at 3090.
40. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LI, in 2 id. at 784.
41. See Mo. CoNsT. of 1776, art. XL, in 3 id. at 1690; N.C. CoNST. of 1776,
art. XXII, in 5 id. at 2788; S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. IX,§ 5, in 6 id. at 3264.
42. N.H. CoNST. of 1784, art. IX, in 4 id. at 2455.
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ies of testamentary disposition in the colonial period suggest that the
practice of testators was seldom to bestow all, or even the bulk, of
their lands on the eldest son and that, aside from the usual preferential treatment of sons, testators generally partitioned their estates in
nearly equal shares. 43 If the changes were primarily formal, why
then should Revolutionary Americans have paid so much attention and attributed so much significance to the reform of the law
of inheritance?
IV.

INHERITANCE LAW AND REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY

The rhetoric of the preambles of the Revolutionary and postRevolutionary acts governing inheritance offers a clue to why reform
was so important. These declarations of legislative purpose reveal
that the regulation of inheritance was viewed as a focal point of scattered, ineffectual statutory efforts to reform the economic structure
of society in order to promote egalitarian ideals and to establish the
foundation of a republican polity." 4 For example, the preamble to
the 1794 Delaware statute repealing an old law granting a double
share to the eldest son declared that "it is the duty and policy of
every republican government to preserve equality amongst its
citizens, by maintaining the balance of property as far as it is consistent with ·the rights of individuals." 45 North Carolina's comprehensive revision of inheritance law in 1784 resounds with the same egalitarian republican ideology:
WHEREAS it will tend to promote that equality of property which is
of the ~pirit and principle of a genuine republic, that the real estates
of persons dying intestate should undergo a more general and equal
distribution than has hitherto prevailed in this state. . . .
And whereas it is almost peculiar to the law of Great-Britain, and
founded in principles of the feudal system, which no longer apply in
that government, and can never apply in this state, that the halfblood
should be excluded from the inheritance. . . •
43. Deen, Patterns of Testations: Four Tidewater Counties in Colonial Virginia,
16 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1S4 (1972); Keim, supra note 33, at S51-S1. See also D,
FISHER, GROWING OLD IN AMERICA 97-98 (1977); Andrews, The Influence of Colonial Conditions as Illustrated in the Connecticut Intestacy Law, in 1 SELECT EssAYS
IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 431 (1907); Smith, Parental Power and Marriage Patterns: An Analysis of Historical Trends in Hingham, Massachusetts, 3S J.
MARR. & FAM. 419 (1973); Waters, Patrimony, Succession, and Social Stability:
Guilford, Connecticut in the Eighteenth Century, 10 PERSPECTIVES AM. HIST. 129
(1976).
44. Of course, not all reform had such lofty ideals. Some revisions were instituted to remedy the disruption caused by the war. See, e.g., 1 Laws of the State of
New York, ch. S9, § 1 (S. Jones & R. Varick ed. 1789) (giving remedies against executors who misappropriated estates during the British occupation).
4S. 2 Laws of the State of Delaware, ch. S3 (S. & J. Adams pub. 1797).
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And whereas entails of estates tend only to raise the wealth and importance of particular families and individuals, giving them an unequal and undue influence in a republic, and prove in manifold instances the source of great contention and injustice. . . .46
To implement these views, the North Carolina legislature replaced
primogeniture with partible inheritance .among sons, eliminated the
discrimination against brothers and sisters of the half blood, and converted all holdings in fee tail to fee simple. 47
The most eloquent and thoroughgoing exponent of this doctrine
was Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson's first great public project was the
reform of Virginia's law, and the revision of the law of inheritance
was the first item on his agenda. 48 Reflecting on this episode in
his autobiography, Jefferson explained the strategic significance of
this portion of the law:
I considered 4 of these bills . . . as forming a system by which every
fibre would be eradicated of antient [sic] or future aristocracy; and
a foundation laid for a government truly republican. The repeal of
the laws of entail would prevent the accumulation and perpetuation
of wealth in select families, and preserve the soil of the country from
being daily more & more absorbed in Mortmain. The abolition of
primogeniture, and equal partition of inheritances removed the feudal
and unnatural distinctions which made one member of every family
rich, and all the rest poor, substituting equal partition, the best of
all Agrarian laws. 49
Jefferson stressed the ease with which this portion of the aristrocratic
legal establishment could be altered: "To effect it no violence was
necessary, no deprivation of natural right, but rather an enlargement
of it by a repeal of the--law." 50
At this early stage in the development of Jefferson's social
thought, he stressed that the creation and maintenance of a republic
required not just barriers to aristocratic accumulation of property, but
also a scheme to distribute at least small parcels of land to all members of the society. This view was reflected iri a bill drafted by Jefferson in January 1778 in which he proposed that every freeborn
Virginian who marries and resides in the state for one year receive
46. 1 The Public Acts of the General Assembly of North Carolina, ch. 22 (J.
Iredell ed., F.X. Martin rev. 1804).

41. Id.
48. See text at note 34 supra.
49. T. JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1743-1790, at 77-78
(P. Ford ed. 1914). For an extended discussion of the subject, see Katz, Thomas
Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary America, 19 J. LAW & EcoN.
467 (1976).
50. T. JEFFERSON, supra note 49, at 58. For a similar expression of opinion by
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"seventy five Acres of waste or unappropriated Land." The purpose
of this measure, Jefferson explained, was to promote "the more
equal Distribution of Lands, and to encourage Marriage and population."51
Jefferson's belief that the yeoman farmer constituted the backbone of a republican society is well known. Less widely recognized,
however, is that his schemes for republicanizing the property law and
for distributing unused land proceeded from his revisionist view of
the history of English land law. Jefferson believed in the theory
of "the Norman Yoke"-that feudalism was a French import, imposed by William the Conqueror upon the democratic Saxons of the
British Isles-and he fervently advocated restoration of the aboriginal political order as he perceived it. "Are we not the better," he
asked Edmund Pendleton in August 1776,
for what we have hitherto abolished of the feudal system? Has not
every restitution of the antient [sic] Saxon laws had happy effects? Is
it not better now that we return at once into that happy system of
our ancestors, the wisest and most perfect ever yet devised by the
wit of man, as it stood before the 8th century? 52

Obviously he thought that it was, and it confirmed him in his view
that land tenures in Virginia were "allodial," or nonfeudal, and,
therefore, that the best policy would be to parcel out the land in
small quantities to the inhabitants of Virginia. Thus, Jefferson's interest in the property system was twofold. First, he sought to identify and extirpate the feudal-aristocratic character of the land law,
especially those particularly egregious vestiges that permitted previous
generations to fetter the use of property in the present. Second, he
proposed to dispose of the territory thus disencumbered by distributing it broadly among the populace.
These were Jefferson's views at the beginning of the Revolution;
his thinking, provoked by his experiences in France, developed
further in the 1780s. Observing firsthand the stark contrast in
Europe between the immense wealth of the landed elite and the
destitution of the landless, .he was convinced that only drastic redistribution of property would alleviate poverty. He attributed the
widespread unemployment of able and willing workers, amid great
James Wilson at the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention, see the debate of June
7, 1787, in 1 THE RECORDS OF TIIE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 159 (M. Farrand ed. 1911).
51. 2 T. JEFFERSON, supra note 25, at 139-40. This portion of the bill was
not enacted, however. Id. at 147 n.12.
52. Id. at 492.
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reserves of uncultivated land, to the high concentration of land
ownership. Because of their great wealth, the proprietors paid no
attention to expanding production. Jefferson recognized "that an
equal division of property is impracticable." "But," he told James
Madison in a famous letter written at Fountainbleu in October 1785,
"the consequences of this enormous inequality producing so much
misery to the bulk of mankind, legislators cannot invent too many
devices for subdividing property, only taking care to let their subdivisions go hand. in hand with the natural affections of the human
mind." 63 Specifically, Jefferson recommended that the rules of inheritance require wide distribution of a decedent's estate among his
relations and that the state levy progressive estate taxes on large
estates. 64
In this and in a second letter to Madison, written in September
1789, Jefferson set forth his philosophical approach to the law of
inheritance. In 1785 he had concluded that
,[w]henever there is in any country, uncultivated lands and unemployed poor, it is clear that the laws of property have been so far
extended as to violate natural right. The earth is given as a common stock for map. to labour and live on [and] . . . [i]f, for the
encouragement of industry we allow it to be appropriated, we must
take care that other employment be furnished to those excluded from
the appropriation. If we do not the fundamental right to labour the
earth returns to the unemployed. 55
Jefferson returned, with greater confidence, to the same theme in
his remarkable letter of 1789, which represents the culmination of
his thinking on the problem of the intergenerational transmission of
wealth. In this letter he proposed to Madison the "self evident"
proposition " 'that the earth belongs in usufruct to the living': that
the dead have neither powers nor rights over it." The critical
passage is worth quoting in full:
The portion occupied by an individual ceases to be his when himself
ceases to be, and reverts to the society. If the society has formed no
rules for the appropriation of it's lands in severality, it will be taken
by the first occupants. These will generally be the wife and children
of the decedent. If they have formed rules of appropriation, those
rules may give it to the wife and children, or to some one of them,
or to the legatee of the deceased. So they may give it to his creditor. But the child, the legatee, or creditor takes it, not by any
53. 8 T. JEFFERSON, supra note 25, at 682; 8 J. MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 386 (R. Rutland & W. Racbal eds. 1973). Note the response from Madison
on June 119, 1786, in 9 id. at 76.
54. 8 T. JEFFERSON, supra note 25, at 682.

55. Id.
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natural right, but by a law of the society of which they are members,
and to which they are subject. Then no man can, by natural right,
oblige the lands he occupied, or the persons who succeed him in that
occupation, to the paiment [sic] of debts contracted by him. For
if he could, he might, during his own life, eat up the usufruct of the
lands for several generations to come, and then the lands would belong to the dead, and not to the living, which would be the reverse
of our principle. 56

We are th.us confronted with the fascinating spectacle of a natural
rights thinker escaping from a natural rights tradition. Jefferson was
perfectly aware that inheritance had generally ,been considered a
natural right, but of course his own conclusions are precisely those
of Blackstone and the positivists. He therefore favored legislation
prescribing a just distribution of intestate property. Yet, the real
logic of his self-evident proposition· might well have led him to advocate the total abolition of inheritance. If the earth truly belongs to
,the living, the right of the dead to stipulate by will the disposition of
· their property is not easily justified, and the legitimacy of intestate
succession seems insecure as well. Of course, by 17 89 Jefferson was
both geographically and politically far removed from the affairs of
state government, and he never again concerned himself with inheritance legislation. Nevertheless, it is significant that at least one influential Revolutionary American perceived that the logic of republican revolution pointed toward radical reevaluation of the law of
inheritance.
Admittedly, Jefferson stood alone among his American compatriots in espousing such radical views. In the broader context of
contemporaneous European ..thought, however, Jefferson represented a main current of "radical" Enlightenment doctrine. To appreciate the intellectual environment in which Jefferson, and Americans
generally, developed their views toward inheritance, one needs to
· consider proposals for the programmatic reform of inheritance law
that circulated in England and France-the European societies with
the strongest political and intellectual affinity with America. Examination of radical thought on inheritance in Europe is valuable in
other respects as well. Comparing the American attitudes toward
inheritance with those expressed in Europe helps identify critical
features of the republican critique of inheritance and, ultimately,
such a comparison aids in the interpretation of the character of the
American Revolution.
The foremost English contemporary who shared Jefferson's radi56. 15 id. at 392-93 (emphasis original).
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cal perspective was Thomas Paine. Paine's thoughts on inheritance
are contained in two works published in the 1790s: the second part
of the Rights of Man, the manifesto that earned Paine conviction for
seditious libel, and Agrarian Justice, his last great pamphlet. Like
Jefferson, Paine regarded poverty as a symptom of the maldistribution of property maintained by the aristocratic pattern of inheritance.
But, where Jefferson advocated statutory revision of the rules of succession, Paine's chosen instrument of reform was the estate tax.
In the second part of the Rights of Man, he proposed a steeply
progressive estate tax, reaching a one hundred per cent marginal rate
for very large estates. He maintained that a large estate is a
"luxury" and should be taxed accordingly, although he recognized
that policy militated against imposing a ceiling on the size of an
estate "acquired by industry." 57 One purpose served by the tax, in
Paine's mind, was to shift the tax burden to those persons best capable of bearing it, but his tax proposal obviously had deeper implications. In Paine's words:
[T]he chief object of this progressive tax (besides the justice of rendering taxes more equal than they are) is . . . to extirpate the overgrown influence arising from the unnatural law of primogeniture, and
which is one of the principle sources of corruption at elections. 58
In short, Paine's proposed tax would apply pecuniary pressures to
achieve the same results as statutory abolition of primogeniture: the
fragmentation of large estates and a more even distribution of property in society.-0 9
Paine returned to the subject of inheritance in Agrarian Justice,
where he developed more explicitly the relationship between his
proposed reforms and his theory of political economy. In Paine's
view, each individual is entitled to exclusive possession of the product of his labor, but .the earth's natural resources-such as land57. 1 T. PAINE, The Rights of Man, in nm COMPLETE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
PAINE 241, 434 (P. Foner ed. 1945). As noted before, see text at note 54 supra, Jefferson had also advocated progressive estate taxation as a means of accomplishing
redistribution of property. In a 1795 letter to Madison, he wrote: "Another means
of silently lessening the inequality of property is to exempt all from taxation below
a certain point, and to tax the higher portions of property in geometrical progression
as they rise." 8 T. JEFFERSON, supra note 25, at '682. However, Jefferson repudiated progressive taxation toward the end of his life. In 1816 he wrote: "If the overgrown wealth of an individual be deemed dangerous to the state, the best corrective
is the law of equal inheritance to all in equal degree; and the better, as this enforces
a law of nature, while extra-taxation violates it." R. ScHLAITER, PRIVATE PROPER1Y:
ToE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 197 (1951) (quoting Jefferson).
58. 1 T. PAINE, The Rights of Man, supra note 57, at 437.
59. Paine noted specifically that the operation of the tax would "supersede the
aristocratical law of primogeniture." Id. at 434.
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belong to all, because "natural property . . . comes to us from the
Creator." 60 Private possession of land came about, Paine reasoned,
when tillage replaced gathering and hunting as the source of society's food supply-the seminal event making possible the transition
of society from a "natural" to a "civilized" state. Cultivation fostered
private ownership of land since the improvement of the land, which
rightfully belongs to the cultivator, was inseparable from the land
itself. 61 Thus, poverty originated as an incident of civilization, for
the appropriation of the land by some denied others their share of
mankind's "natural inheritance."
Cultivation is at least one of the greatest natural improvements ever
made by human invention. It has given to created earth a tenfold
value. But the landed monopoly that began with it has produced
the greatest evil. It has dispossessed more than half the inhabitants
of every nation of their natural inheritance . . . and has thereby
created a species of poverty and wretchedness that did not exist before. 62

Paine advanced a simple solution to restore the "natural" order
without disturbing private ownership of property. His plan called
for the collection of a "ground-rent" from each proprietor, represent. ing the use value of the appropriated "natural property," and for the
distribution of the proceeds to all members of society, who collectively own this property. More specifically, he proposed the establishment of a fund, maintained by a moderate estate tax, from which
each citizen would receive a lump sum on his twenty-first birthday
and a P,ension upon reaching the age of fifty. 63
Although Paine emphasized that adoption of his plan would
immediately benefit society by meliorating the condition of the
masses, he was plainly inspired by more than altruism. Paine envisioned a transformation of society. "The present state of civilization," he stated, "is as odious as it is unjust. It is absolutely the
opposite of what it should be, and it is necessary that a revolution
should be made in it." 64 Far from being merely a social welfare
60. 1 T. PAINE, Agrarian Justice, in id. at 606.
61. Id. at 611-12.
62. Id. at 612.
63. Under Paine's plan, a flat ten per cent tax rate would be levied on the portion
of the estate inherited by the decedent's issue, with a surtax rising to ten per cent
levied on that portion transmitted to others, the rate increasing according to the remoteness of the transferee. Id. at 615.,16. The tax applied to both real and personal property because, as Paine argued, no individual could acquire personal property without the aid of society, therefore, "he owes on every principle of justice, of
gratitude, and of civilization, a part of that accumulation back again to society from
whence the whole came." Id. at 620.
64. Id. at 617.
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measure, Paine conceived the estate tax as the linchpin in the realization of this vision. 65
The occasion for recasting inheritance law did not arise in
eighteenth-century England, where the republican answer to the
question of inheritance, as on other questions, subsisted for the
moment only in doctrine. To find a legislative counterpoint to the
revision of inheritance law . in America, attention must turn to
France. A glance at the doctrines espoused by the French revolutionaries in regard to inheritance confirms our earlier observation
that the constitution of the law of inheritance has a capital strategic
importance to the framers of a republican order. Moreover, the republicanization of the institution of inheritance in France evinces the
confrontation between the natural rights and the positivist theories
of property law. As with Jefferson, the French proponents of reform were compelled to overcome their original natural rights orientation to justify the measures they advanced.
By 1791 republicanism was the official creed of the French
Revolution, and the revolutionaries recognized that the Romanofeudal system of inheritance by which the Old Regime had oper:ated
was part and parcel of the system of inherited privilege and entrenched wealth against which the Revolution initially aimed. As
the Comte de Mirabeau pointed out to the Constituent Assembly in
the midst of its debate on intestate succession: "You have begun by
destroying feudalism, you pursue today its effects." 60
65. The ideological inspiration underlying the proposals of Paine and Jefferson
differentiates them from other proponents of reform, such as Jeremy Bentham, who
were motivated primarily by pragmatic fiscal concerns. Bentham, for example, denounced the natural rights .thesis about inheritance while proposing in a crudely written pamphlet published in 1795 that the entire estate escheat to the state if the decedent lacked "near relations" and that the power to devise property by will apply only
to one-half of such a decedent's estate, the remainder going to the state. 1 J. BEN'IHAM, Supply Without Burthen; or Escheat Vice Taxation, in JEREMY BENTIIAM's
EcoNOMIC WRITINGS 279, 283-84, 310 (W. Stark ed. 1952). Despite the revolutionary tenor of this proposal, Bentham disclaimed radical political goals. He exempted
the peerage from the plan, conceding the desirability of preserving the aristocracy.
Id. at 328. Bentham's aims, not surprisingly, were utilitarian. He believed that most
taxation aroused hostility because it deprived people of what they had expected to
enjoy. Id. at 292. Similarly, in Bentham's view, the intricacies and uncertainties
of the traditional system of inheritance worked hardship on many by denying an expected legacy. Id. at 319. Therefore, under Bentham's plan, no property would
be taken from one who expected to enjoy it, since the law would make clear the limited expectations for inheritance. Id. at 292-93. In short, Bentham regarded his
scheme as the least disruptive mode of taxation. He explained that "[t]he characteristic of this measure, is to shew more tenderness to [the] feelings [of individuals],
than can be shewn by the taxes to which it is proposed to substitute it." Id. at 305
(emphasis original).
66. 9 P. BUCHEZ & P. Roux, HISTOIRE PARLEMENTAIRE DE LA REVOLUTION FRANCAISE 285 (Paris 1834).
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In April 1791 the Constituent Assembly made a first effort to
extirpate the ancien regime with the adoption of a "Decree Relative
to the Distribution of Intestate Successions."
The decree announced:
All inequality formerly resulting, among heirs ab intestat, from
qualities of age or of youth, from sex distinctions or from customary
exclusions, whether in direct line or in the collateral line, is abolished. 67
The debates in the Assembly, however, reveal that republican
ideology in France was not satisfied with equality in intestate succession. The powerful egalitarian thrust of French republicanism
insisted on equality in testate succession as well. For example, the
Jacobin delegate Petion demaqded in the 1791 debates that the Assembly "destroy for the future all of the inequalities of distribution
resulting from the arbitrary will of the family head." 68
The Comte de Mirabeau, himself a disinherited son, prepared
the principal speech of the debate. This address, delivered by Tallyrand as its author was on his death bed, expands Petion's theme:
Here is the fundamental question which presents itself: Should the
law admit among us the free disposition of wealth in the direct line,
that is to say, should a father or a mother, a grandfather or a grandmother, have the right to dispose at their wish of their fortune by
contract or by testament, and to establish thereby inequality in the
possession of domestic goods? 69
One turns to Robespierre, just as one turned to Jefferson, for
exposition of the revolutionary republican doctrine by its most renowned advocate. Robespierre praised the delegates for having
abolished preferences in intestate succession, but, urging them to
strike deeper, he inveighed against the right of testation as enabling
.an individual to defeat the egalitarian policy embodied in the new
regime for intestate succession. "You have decreed," he intoned,
"that equality shall be the ·basis of [intestate] succession. Will you
permit this law to be violated by the private will of man?" 70 Like
Jefferson and Paine, Robespierre regarded revision of the law of inheritance as critical to the establishment of the material substructure
of a republican polity. He maintained that free testation is necessarily inimical to the ideal social order, in which equality prevails:
61. Decret relatif au partage des successions ab intestat, in 2 CoLLECilON COM•
PLETE DES LOIS, DECRETS, ORDONNANCES, REGLEMENS, ET AVIS DU CONSEIL--D'ETAT
348 (J. Duvergier ed. 1824) (Decree of April 15, 1791).
68. 9 P. BuCHEZ & P. Roux, supra note 66, at 284.
69. Id. at 286.
10. Id. at 299.
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"The too great inequality of fortunes is the source of political inequality [and] of the destruction of liberty."71 Robespierre went
so far as to suggest that the power to dispose of property by will
should be abolished altogether. "Can a man dispose of that land
he has tilled," he asked, "at the moment he is reduced to dust? No,
the property of a man after his death ought to return to the public
domain of society." 72 Nevertheless, Robespierre opposed complete
abolition of testation. He favored allowing an individual to direct
the disposition of part of his estate so long as the testator divided
the property equally among his heirs. 73
The Constituent Assembly did not embrace Robespierre's
recommendation. In March 1793, however, the Assembly's successor, the National Convention, did enact legislation abolishing the
power to make inter vivos or testamentary transfers of property to
descendents, thereby subjecting all estates to the egalitarian distribution imposed by the law of intestate succession. This legislation did
not abolish inheritance; rather, it demonstrated that the French
revolutionaries were prepared to go to relatively extreme lengths
to achieve the vision of formal legal equality among all citizens. 74 .
The revolutionaries never seriously threatened to abolish private
property. Even Robespierre was a moderate on the question of
property rights, 75 and there is little evidence of agitation for radical
11. Id.
12. Id. at 300.
73. Id. at 300-01.
74. As George Lefebvre observed, "[fhe Constituent Assembly] closely joined
equality to liberty, and by bringing the resounding collapse of privileges and feudalism the popular revolution highlighted equality as the Anglo-Saxons had not done.
The revolutionaries and even the bourgeoisie valued the attainment of equality above
all else." G. LEFEBVRE, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION FROM ITS ORIGINS TO 1793, at
146 (1962).
The reforms of the Constituent Assembly did not long survive intact, however,
as Napoleon later restored much of the power of testation. For a recent discussion
of French inheritance law in this period, see Giesey, Rules of Inheritance and Strategies of Mobility in Prerevolutionary France, 82 AM. HlsT. REv. 271 (1977). Giesey
explains the rich complexity of coutumier law and its relationship to French politicoeconomic change in the revolutionary era. See also J. Traer, Equality in the Year
Two: The Development of French Succession Law at the End of the Eighteenth
Century (Oct. 1976) (unpublished paper delivered to the 6th Annual Meeting of the
American Society for Legal History, Philadelphia). For a novel reinterpretation of
the significance of private property during the French Revolution, see Taylor, Noncapitalist Wealth and the Origins of the French Revolution, 12 AM. HIST. REv. 469
(1967).
15. 2 J. THOMPSON, ROBESPIERRE 39-40 (1935). Robespierre may have been
concerned more with the image than the actual achievement of equality. In 1793
he wrote: "Personally, I think equality of wealth even less necessary for private than
for public happiness. It is much more necessary to make poverty respected than to
ban millionaires (proscrire ['opulence)." Id. at 40.
·
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reform of the French institution of property. 76 Nevertheless, the debates on inheritance did expose certain ambiguities in the fundamental attitudes of the revolutionaries toward property. The Declaration
of the Rights of Man .and Citizen, promulgated 27 August 1789, reflected a pronounced commitment to the natural rights theory of
property. Article Two, for example, announced that "[t]he aim of
every political association is the preservation of the natural and inalienable rights of man," 77 among which was the right of property.
Article Seventeen stated the natural rights position even more emphatically: "Since property is a sacred and inviolable right, no one
may be deprived thereof unless a legally established public necessity
obviously requires it, and upon condition of a just and previous indemnity." 78
The proponents of radical revision of the laws of inheritance,
however, contended that property is a social creation, properly subject to the limitations imposed by society in order to achieve its
broader ideals. In his address to the Constituent Assembly in 1781,
Mirabeau asserted that
[a]s property is based on the social structure [l'etat social], it is subjected, like the other benefits over which society is arbiter, to laws
[and] to conditions; thus we see everywhere the right of property
subjected to certain rules, and restricted, according to the case, to
limits more or less narrow. . . .
Society is thus entitled to refuse its members, in this or that case,
the capacity to dispose arbitrarily of their fortune. 79
Robespierre pursued a similar theme in his speech to the
Assembly. Stating that the property of a decedent returns to the
public domain, he contended that "it is only for the public interest
that [society] transmits this wealth to the issue of the . . . owner;
but, the public interest is in equality. Thus, it is necessary that in
every case equality be established in the succession." 80
Robespierre criticized the Declaration of Rights for failing to define necessary limits on the freedom of the use of property. In his
view, the document was "not so much a declaration of the rights of
men, as a declaration of the rights of capitalists [riches], profiteers,
speculators, and tyrants." 81 To remedy this dangerous omission,
16. See R. PALMER, TwELVE WHO RULED 280-304 (1941).
77. J. STEWART, A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY OF THE FRENCH
(1951).
78. Id. at 115.
79. 9 P. BucHEZ & P. Roux, supra note 66, at 288.
80. Id. at 300.
81. 2 J, THOMPSON, supra note 75, at 40.
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Robespierre proposed a slate of amended articles to make clear that
the state may curb an individual's property rights in order to protect
the rights of others. He suggested, for example, that Article Two
read: "The right of property is limited, like every other right, by
the duty of respecting the rights of others."82
Clearly the French Revolution occasioned a more sweeping
revision of the law of inheritance than did the American Revolution.
Like Jefferson and Paine, 83 the French revolutionaries did not question the fundamental concept of private property, but an ardent desire for equality inspired the French to rewrite in bold strokes the
rules governing succession to property. The legislation amending
inheritance in Revolutionary America was, in comparison, quite
tame. Yet, notwithstanding the striking contrast in the substance of
the changes wrought, the significance of the French and American
statutory programs to their respective authors was comparable. The
proponents of revision conceived of reform as one important means to
achieve, or at least to express, related ideological ends. The reforms
in America had smaller compass than those in France, commensurate with the more moderate stance of American republicanism.
In addition, the reform process everywhere manifested a philosophical reorientation with respect to the concept of property rights.
The remaining presupposition-that the power of testamentary disposition, like other capacities to use and transfer property, is a
"natural right" upon which the state cannot rightly infringe-was
permanently displaced by the doctrine that an individual's· rights in
property subsist by grace of society. Under this view, the state justifiably limits property rights where their exercise ·would contravene
higher social values. It is important to realize that this development
did not represent an abandonment of the belief in' a "natural order"
in favor of a complete relativism: the proponents of reform-Paine
is an obvious example-continued to speak in terms of natural
"rights." Rather, they ascribed a new content to these preordained
rights, and they accorded to the right of inheritance a much lower
priority than they did to the more general right to property.
82. Id.

83. Paine's commitment to private property is reflected in his comment that a system of compensating individuals dispossessed of their "natural inheritance," thereby
eliminating indigency, "is necessary as well for the protection of property as for the
sake of justice and humanity." 1 T. PAINE, Agrarian Justice, supra note 57, at 620.
To Paine, the virtue of his plan was that ft restored social justice, yet strengthened
rather than disturbed the economic system of private property that made civilization
possible. Id. at 620-21.
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CONCLUSION

It has been 1 said that the contrast between the French and
American revolutions is that between social and political revolution. 84 Even if one neither underestimates the turbulence and resulting dislocations during the period of the American Revolution
nor overestimates the discontinuity between French society before
and after the Revolution of 1789, it seems clear that the society that
emerged after 177 6 was the logical and evolutionary successor to colonial America in a manner totally unlike the considerably more profound transformation in France. One might more accurately describe the American experience as a "reform movement" than as an
"internal revolution."
Ultimately, inheritance is not a conclusive test for the character
of the American Revolution, for it was an epiphenomenon of the
larger social process. The changes instituted in the law of inheritance were not trivial85 or startling. Neither primogeniture nor entail,
the principal targets of statutory revision, were widely practiced before the Revolution-in several colonies they had never existedso that in some sense the Revolution cannot even be credited with
truly reforming the law of inheritance. Yet, insofar as the Revolution ratified rather than inspired this reform, its impact on the institution of inheritance typifies the significance of the Revolution to
many areas of American society. As Bernard Bailyn has observed,
the Revolution confirmed developments that had been taking place
in the colonies and had been transforming them, unknowingly, into
a new society and nation:
In behalf of Enlightenment liberalism the revolutionary leaders undertook to complete, formalize, systematize and symbolize what previously had been only partially realized, confused, and disputed
matters of fact. Enlightenment ideas were not instruments of a particular social group, nor did they destroy a social order. They did
not create new social and political forces in America. They released
84. See H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 87 (1963).
85. Alexis de Tocqueville carried the argument to its furthest extreme, contending that "the law of inheritance was the last step to equality." 1 A. DB TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 47 (P. Bradley ed. 1945). He believed that "the law of
equal division exercises its influence not merely upon the property itself, but it affects the minds of the heirs and brings their passions into play. These indirect consequences tend powerfully to the destruction of large fortunes, and especially of large
domains." Id. at 48-49. For this reason, "[w]hen the legislator has once regulated
the law of inheritance, he may rest from his labor." Id. at 48. De Tocqueville
here overestimates both the theoretical and actual impact of republican laws of inheritance upon nineteenth-century American society.
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those that had long existed, and vastly increased their power. 86
Political and economic liberalism were at the core of these emergent
American social forces, and the search for a theoretical justification
for what the Americans regarded as their essential task-separation
from Britain and formation of a new nation-progressively drew
them to republican models of social organization. The patermµism
and aristocratic bias inherent in the traditional Anglo-American system of inheritance were increasingly perceived to be incompatible
with republican attitudes toward economics and politics. The traditional system represented an economic order in which a propertied
elite preserved monopolistic control over a critical resource and protected large fortunes from the rigors of individual enterprise.
But in fact the Americans were most sensitive to the political
connotations of the traditional laws of inheritance. Primogeniture
and entail preserved and transmitted political as well as economic
fortunes. The Americans rejected categorically the notion that political office is a private possession transmittable by the laws
of succession. As George Mason declared in the Virginia Declaration of Rights:
no Man, or Set of Men are entitled to exclusive. or separate
Emoluments or Privileges from the Community, but in Consideration
of public Services; which not being descendible, or hereditary, the
Ideal of a Man born a Magistrate, a Legislator, or a Judge is unnatural and absurd. 87
The same precept is reflected hr the rhetoric of the North Carolina statutes repealing the traditional inheritance laws and in the
words of the lawyer who in 1788 sought to convince the Delaware
Court of Errors and Appeals that his client's inheritance was in fee
simple: "estates in fee tail are no favourites of the law, and particularly ought not to be so, under republican forms of government, so
that if there be any doubt in this case, determination should incline
rather towards the appellants. " 88 The fundamental notion was that,
in a republic, careers should be based upon talent rather than
status. 80
In evaluating the significance of the reform in inheritance law,
86. Bailyn, Political Experience and Enlightenment Ideas in Eighteenth-Century
America, 61 AM. HIST. REV. 339, 351 (1962).
87. Mason's draft of the Declaration of Rights, May 20-26, 1776, in 1 G. MASON,
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, 1725.J1792, at 277 (R. Rutland ed. 1970).
88. Robinson v. Lessee of Adams, 4 Dall. xii, xiv (Del. 1788).
89. For an unusually perceptive account of the problem of inherited authority in
English political theory, see P. Lucas, supra note 2, at 195-264.
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it is essential to keep in mind what the reform effort in America
did not do. The Americans did not attempt to legislate equality.
After all, the debate about revision of the law of intestate succession
was only ·aboµt the necessity for equalizing the claims of children
(or at least male children) to the estates of their parents. In France,
as we have seen, equality was the primary objective of reform in
the law of inheritance. The French revolutionaries went so far as
to subordinate a property owner's testamentary desires to the policy
of egalitarianism. In this country, however, the objective was more
to destroy primogeniture and entail than to achieve equality among
children. Designed to limit concentrations of landed property and
to end the political dominance of a landed elite, American statutory
reform removed devices of compulsory inequality, but stopped short
of requiring equality. Egalitarianism was not the animus of the
American Revolutio~, as indeed it could not have been in a society
whose leadership included many proprietors of slave labor.
The reform of inheritance law thus carried a symbolic importance disproportionate to the significance of its substantive implications. The attitudes toward inheritance delineate in a small way certain fundamental contours of American Revolutionary ideology. In
the case of inheritance, Revolutionary theory encountered theoretical
difficulties that it did not find elsewhere because the natqral rights
tradition, which formed so large a part of the theory, so forthrightly
proclaimed the right of inheritapce. As long as the Revolution went
no further than reform, conceptual dissonance was avoided. But in
altering the traditional practice of inheritance, Americans were
increasingly drawn to the positivistic explications of the right (as, to
be sure, their English and French contemporaries were). This
positivism, combined with rigorous and logical republicanism, led
Jefferson, Paine, and the French revolutionaries to more radical conclusions, but the moderation of the mainstream of thought in early
America becomes apparent when contrasted with Jefferson's most
ambitious proposals. The logic of revolution in America would sustain neither an agrarian law nor the abolition of inheritance, although obviously either would theoretically have helped create a
purer republic.
In 1775 Patrick Henry wrote: "I have but one lamp by which
my feet are planted, and that is the lamp of experience. I know
of no way of judging the future hut by the past." 90 The American
90. H.

COLBOURN,

THE LAMP OF EXPERIENCE xi (1965) (quoting Henry).
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Revolutionary leaders were insistent upon the practical wisdom of
history (of which the common law was an -important part), for it·
demonstrated to them the virtues and true principles of republicanism. At the same time, they were pragmatists of the most remarkable sort, who believed that they held their destiny in their own
hands. History showed that primogeniture and entail were feudal
remains that had no place in a republican scheme of things and that
represented the dead hand of an aristocratic corporatism they rejected. They were believers in a scientific history-the study of the
past to develop principles for present policy-but opponents of the
tyranny of the past. For such men the anachronism of the law of
inheritance was an appropriate and symbolically fortuitous focus for
their efforts. But they also drew from history a .fear of violent
change and a real concern for continuity, and they were reluctant
to move too far and too quickly. In reforming inheritance, they excised the most egregious anachronisms without altering those fundamental principles that seemed ·suitable and even central to a society
that on the whole they thoroughly admired.
·

